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Allegoiy in the Technological Age: 
A Case Study of Ibsen's The Wild Duck 
Wolfgang Sohlich 
Ibsen's use of the studio in The Wild Duck offers the opportunity for 
exploring an explicitly modernist approach to allegory. I intend to take 
advantage of this opportunity by appealing to Walter Benjamin's commentaries 
on two allegorists of industrial society, the amateur collector and the 
photographer.1 Old Ekdal, Hedvig, and Hjalmar take possession of the 
captain's treasure, enrich his collection, and ultimately construct a human 
habitat from the poverty of objects at their disposal. The photo apparatuses 
strewn about the studio point beyond the semiotics of professional 
classification to an estranged mode of making and a crisis of experience 
subjected to control by technology. The dramatic and theoretical texts are 
sufficiently complex to warrant a gradual and patient exposition. I hope that 
by first developing the general contours of modern allegory from the dramatic 
text with a minimum of theory, it will be easier to follow the broader 
theoretical premises later. But I should point out now that I will give a 
materialist reading of modern allegory~as distinguished from theological or 
psychological readings-based on the allegorical hermeneutics of the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 by the early Marx. I will therefore only 
concentrate on the materialist implications of Benjamin's commentaries, 
ignoring the more recondite messianic speculations and the distinctly surrealist 
sensibility that color his understanding of allegory.2 
I 
The camera is a machine that reproduces images of the phenomenal 
world by chemical or electronic processes. Its gaze is inherently indifferent to 
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the subjects and essentially confines itself to the limits of sentience drawn by 
sight and the visual field determined by technology. Photos can signify the 
mutilation of human experience, the dismemberment of the activity of human 
making resulting from advanced social divisions of labor. The camera that 
reproduces only disconnected fragments of a surface reality creates effects that 
are analogous to the distribution of isolated and repeatable tasks of a complete 
activity to different categories of the labor force.3 Photography is both sign 
and signified of modern allegory because its form conveys the fragmentation 
and ruin of modern culture and the experience of loss and dying inner life 
associated with it.4 In Kleine Geschichte der Photographie Walter Benjamin, 
who was especially sensitive to happy encounters between technique and art, 
argues that early photography did not merely capture this experience of 
disjunction and loss, but left decipherable traces of a forgotten human 
sentience.5 I will return to the figurative meaning of these traces in connection 
with my interpretation of the loft. However, since I am interpreting the 
practice of photography in the play as a historical and not purely technological 
fact, as a practice implying a relationship between technology and a mode of 
human making, it is important not to lose sight of Benjamin's attentiveness to 
historical specificity. Benjamin claims that the context for photography 
changed after 1880, a date usually associated with the definitive 
institutionalization of late capitalist society and clearly pertinent to The Wild 
Ducky which was completed in 1884.6 Briefly, Benjamin's argument is as 
follows: 1. A combination of technical innovations—cameras became more 
sensitive to light and the quality of photos could be enhanced through the 
technique of retouching—eliminated the play of light and shade by which early 
photography made visible a hidden life glimmering through the facticity of the 
isolated fragment. Technology erased the suggestive human traces from the 
copy of appearances. 2. The human countenance of early photography was 
suggestive of silence. It did not as yet bear the signature of mass culture. In 
contrast, the subjects of post-1880 photography were embalmed in poses 
" . . . whose rigidity betrayed the powerlessness of this generation in the face 
of technological progress." (Schriften, II-I 377) The human being had become 
mere subject of an ideological discourse. The signature was the indelible mark 
of estrangement from the realities of late capitalist life and from a forgotten 
human sentience which early photography could still remember. This is why 
Kierkegaard could say of photography that it makes us all look the same, so 
that we shall only need one portrait.7 Photography after 1880 discloses the 
extension of the rule of equivalent exchange from political economy to cultural 
reproduction. 
The post-1880 marriage between technology and cultural reproduction 
defines the practice of photography in the studio. As a mode determining 
human interactions it also supercedes the marriage between virtuous partners 
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haunting the untimely hermeneutics of Gregers' classical bourgeois 
consciousness. Hjalmar is a commercial photographer called upon to 
document the social rites of the bourgeoisie. (II 159) His photos have no 
redeeming artistic value; it is good for the digestion to look at pictures after 
dinner suggests the Flabby Gentleman. (1136) All photographers in the Ekdal 
household are familiar with the technique of retouching photos. (II 159; III 
178,182,184) Gina is the original, self-taught photographer. (Ill 184) Having 
lost her place as maid in the Werle home, she acquires the technical skills to 
survive in a harsh market reality. Photography enables her to marry into 
former gentry because she has marketable skills Hjalmar lacked. Inasmuch as 
Gina's severely circumscribed upward social mobility and the decline of the 
Ekdal family come to rest in the practice of commercial photography, the 
activity signifies primarily their exposure to capitalist market relationship and 
a human experience reduced to the brute fact of survival. By capitalist market 
relations I simply mean that Haakon's wealth and social power stand in direct 
relationship to the human and economic devaluation of the Ekdals. The 
historically specific use of technology accounts for the resemblances between 
the objective indifference of the camera's eye and the subjective indifference 
of the photographer. There are no passages indicating that photography is 
anything other than a job for Gina; and Hedvig would rather learn the 
creative craft of engraving (III 182), although she occasionally helps retouch 
photos. But in a family that still poses as a patriarchy Hjalmar is supposed to 
have a professional calling. Yet he is the most reluctant photographer in the 
family who would rather tackle a good herring salad or putter with pliers and 
chisel in the loft. (Ill 179) The relationship between producer and product is 
both disjunctive and analogous. Hjalmar's indifference conveys the inner 
emptiness of a life that is uncaring, listless, insensible, and undifferentiated. 
His (in)difference is at odds with the experience affected in photos. Subjects 
of portrait photography strike poses. In the etymological sense of the word 
they pause, interrupting the context of their reality in order to make a copy 
that presents them as particular, differentiated, and socially significant charac-
ters. Photos misrepresent a reality in which human interactions are mediated 
by a depersonalizing technology. But for the allegorist the disjunction between 
the image/sign and the social signified is itself a sign of the allegorization of 
culture. The psychic mechanization associated with the practice of 
photography is analogous to the experience suggested by the serialized 
reproduction of fragmentary images of poses embalmed in a still. The death 
of inner life precipitated by the impoverishment of human sentience in making 
is duplicated in the death masks of the human countenance affecting 
particularity and significance as frozen and decontextualized gestures. 
Photography ultimately discloses the fragmented and reified character of 
ideological representations. 
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Ibsen the allegorist does not allow us to see Hjalmar's billboard photos, 
although the stupefying unreality of a culture reduced to posturing appearances 
could easily be conveyed pictorially in production. But Ibsen has created a 
character whose emotional life and utterances resemble faithful reproductions 
of a haphazard collection of stills. I think one can safely say that Hjalmar is, 
in fact, a poseur and that he misrepresents his reality as a social declasse, 
indifferent photographer, and powerless pater familias in cultural mythologies 
that had currency in another era. I will return to the social context of his 
fables later, in connection with Gregers' ideological narrative of the ideal 
couple. For the moment I am concerned with the effects of a mode of 
production mediated by technology on Hjalmar's life and the culture that his 
utterances bring forth. Hjalmar has gotten a bit rotund over the last sixteen 
years; but he claims he has virile, broad shoulders. (I 131) His hair is curly; 
but he prefers to call curls waves. (II 153) He becomes understandably 
unravelled when his father goes to prison; but the world-destroying experience 
of complete social collapse stands objectified as a manifestation of his fiery 
temperament. (IV 206) "In the poor photographer's home the roof is low, I 
know that well. And circumstances are narrow. But I am an inventor, 
Gregers—the breadwinner of my family-and that lifts me above the 
circumstances of my surroundings. Ah, lunch!" (Ill 190) Hjalmar's insincere 
sincerity transfigures the social destruction of his family wrought by the 
capitalist Haakon into a quaint, sentimental tableau of the struggling genius 
and household head, living the legend of distinguished, romantic marginality 
and heroic self-sacrifice while his stomach clamors for more nourishing food. 
But Hjalmar does not live legends. He pulls them out of the cultural 
deep-freeze as if they were last year's leftovers. Even unspeakable grief and 
joy, those shades of sentience to which silence alludes, are reified in mindless 
chatter about ". . . the tragedy of the house of Ekdal" (III 187) and his 
. . . "poor, shipwrecked old father . . ." (II 159) Hjalmar plays classical 
domestic drama in a world domesticated by the power of capital. The flotsam 
and jetsam of a defunct culture have sedimented in his cavernous mind and 
closed all roads to his intellect and heart. This transference from object to 
subject, more precisely from product to producer, redirects critique from 
purely psychological and moral considerations of character to a materialist 
context of human making. How much, Marx asked, do men work through 
machines and how much as machines? (M 291) Hjalmar's life is as 
mechanized as his photo apparatuses or Haakon's saws. Conversely, the 
cultural debris which he recycles through his utterances signify culture at best 
as waste product and at worst as dead matter reprocessed for propaganda 
purposes and cultural subjection. Modern allegory simultaneously conveys the 
abstractness of cultural fragmentation and the abstractness of human 
experience misshaped by a market-directed technology. 
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The collector is the true inmate of the interior. He makes the 
transfiguration of things his business. To him falls the Sisyphean 
task of obliterating the commodity-like character of things through 
his ownership of them. . . . The collector dreams that he is not only 
in a distant or past world but also, at the same time, in a better one, 
in which, although men are as unprovided with what they need as 
they are in the everyday world, things are free from the drudgery of 
being useful.8 
For Benjamin, the amateur collector is an allegorist just like the photographer. 
His world is made up of bits and pieces rescued from the forgotten context of 
a distant past. Both inhabit and interpret cultural ruins. In other words, the 
reality of cultural disintegration invites their destructive ministrations. But 
unlike the photographer of post-1880 society, whose image/fragments are 
standard evidence of the rigor mortis of psychic life, the collector treats each 
object/fragment as a hologram, i. e., a fragment in which can be discerned the 
signs of a forgotten, palpable reciprocity between subject and object. The 
photographer records the uniform grey of indifferent and undifferentiated life 
controlled by a means/end technology. Life and objects have value as labor 
and raw materials in the service of profit. The collector, who salvages what 
can no longer be processed for profit, rediscovers the spectrum of colors and 
shades in the reciprocity between a vibrant inner life and objects that return 
our gaze.9 The collector's experience is analogous to that of children who 
perceive in the cultural waste products ". . . The face that the world of things 
turns toward them. . . ."10 Like the child the collector exalts the objects of his 
or her reverence and thereby delivers them from the semiotics of price and 
profit. Child and collector do not attempt to reassemble the broken pieces of 
the past, though. But they rediscover and experience intuitively forgotten but 
enduring bonds with nature. (I, O-WS 69). This remembrance of a forgotten, 
whole world constitutes the figurative truth of the allegorical fragment. 
One of the genealogical links between Benjamin's amateur collector and 
the inmates of the studio interior is the sea captain. Old Ekdal, Hedvig, and 
Hjalmar are the real and spiritual heirs of his abandoned treasure. They treat 
it with reverence, add to the collections, and ultimately create a world from the 
poverty of objects. Another link is formed by the child who shares the 
experience of the collector. Hedvig is her kin. The objects in the loft are not 
emblems offering clues to past historical eras or insight into revealed truth. 
The flightless, wild duck and the captain's name-Flying Dutchman (III 
181-82)-intimate that the loft harbors the dream of a freer life. The same is 
true of Ekdal's rabbit hunts and his petrified forest. Both recall the free life 
of the bear hunter who roamed the uncharted forest before it became raw 
material for Haakon's saw mill. But this freedom is not associated with a 
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particular historical period. There are lots of books in the loft which Hedvig 
does not read because they are written in English. The loft does not produce 
knowledge governed by concepts. And the pictures of castles and churches 
that Hedvig finds in Harrison's History of London do not refer to romantic 
transfigurations of the Middle Ages. When Gregers asks Hedvig if the world 
in the loft is different, she replies emphatically: "Quite, quite different. And 
there are so many strange things in there" (III 181). One should be attentive 
to the phenomenological import of the perceptions that cluster around her 
intuitive description. To experience something as strange does not only imply 
that it is outside the purview of one's previous experiences. The strange object 
is both near and distant; and this simultaneity of past and present, distance and 
proximity, conveys a relationship that is reverential and shy. The inmates of 
the interior care for the singular and unique object. Hedvig is attentive to 
detail when she describes the old bureau with drawers and bits that slide out 
or the big clock with figures that are meant to pop out. (Ill 181) The same 
can be said of Hjalmar and his father when they disassemble and reassemble 
the old hunting rifle or take pliers and chisel to build a path to the duck's 
water trough. (Ill 179) There is a subtle but pervasive ambience of silence 
and quiet passion emanating from the loft, a stillness punctuated intermittently 
by happy chatter and rifle shots announcing Ekdal's rabbit hunts and abruptly 
broken by the shot that ends Hedvig's life. Benjamin describes this ambience 
as aura: "Experience of the aura (thus) rests on the transposition of a response 
common in human relationships to the relationship between the inanimate or 
natural object and man" (/ OSMBy 188). Objects are perceived as being 
capable of returning our gaze. The aura that emanates from them discloses a 
forgotten human sentience (ein vergessenes Menschliches) that embraces subject 
and object in a play of proximity and distance. Hedvig's nurturing relationship 
to a 'useless' duck or Ekdal's caring preservation of the forest are 
commemorative ceremonials of remembrance. Oblivious to the garrulous 
recitations of studio mythologies in which subjects act out the drama of their 
reified existence, the inmates of the interior remember a past and better world 
where objects silently reveal to them a human reality erased from the subjects 
and objects ruled by the means/end rationality of technology. 
The experience of aura is not associated with the romantic topos of 
paradise lost, mythical or historical. Aura discloses experiential possibilities 
that are fully immanent in the activities of human making. In the 'real' world 
human relations are controlled by a market-directed technology although, 
according to Gregers, they ought to come under the jurisdiction of the cultural 
father. In the loft the wild duck's place is preeminent. As an emblematic 
figure she signifies the intricate connections between humans and the natural 
world. Hedvig's affections for the duck run especially deep because 
". . . there's so much that's strange about the wild duck. No one knows her, 
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and no one knows where she came from" (III 183). I will disregard for the 
moment the obvious analogy between Hedvig's and the duck's indeterminate 
natural origins. The uncertainty of the duck's genealogy is significant in and 
of itself. It suggests that nature is not subjected to a classificatory code 
determining a genealogical hierarchy. The otherness or strangeness of nature 
derives negatively from the fact that it falls outside the purview of cultural 
administration. But to be free from the power of administrative control is a 
condition of the auratic experience which the materialist Benjamin links to the 
activity of the craftsman: 
If we designate as aura the associations which . . . tend to 
cluster around the object of perception, then its analogue in the case 
of the utilitarian object is the experience which has left traces of the 
practical hand.11 
The activities in the loft leave unmistakable imprints of the practical hand. 
Hedvig takes care of the wild duck while the men build and putter with pliers 
and chisel. Objects also reveal traces of a human presence. The bureau with 
sliding slats, the intricate design of the clock, paintings, engravings, all bear the 
signature of human reverence for the material worked on by anonymous 
hands. In shaping natural objects the craftsman brings the entire spectrum of 
human sentience and skill into play. While the thing created may serve 
utilitarian ends, the unique and singular imprints of the creator's hand bring 
the object nearer to the beholder. Thus the reciprocity between creator and 
thing created is an embodied reciprocity because the forgotten human traces 
that Benjamin associates with aura ultimately convey the truth of natural 
history in human history. Temporality is a phenomenological given of natural 
history. The engraving of death holding an hour glass in one hand and a little 
girl by the other is a traditional allegorical emblem of all that is untimely, 
ephemeral, and unconsoled about human life. However, I think it would be 
mistaken to reduce the subtle intrications between human experience in 
crafting things and natural history to medieval emblems of death. In the 
engraving death confronts the secular beholder as an abstract, universal 
concept. Temporality is torn from the interior of human experience and 
stands outside the observer as a rigidly objectified, measurable quantity of 
time, analogous to clock time. The horror Hedvig feels when looking at this 
picture (III 181) is understandable because, when viewed in isolation, it 
conveys a nihilistic version of temporality in which the incompleteness of life 
condemned to die empties time of all specific content. But in the loft the old 
clock no longer keeps track of time; and this detail is significant because it 
alludes to a uniquely human transformation of temporality. Once again 
Benjamin is pertinent: 
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What is aura intrinsically? A strange tissue of space and time: 
unique, non-recurrent (einmalige) appearance of a distance, no 
matter how near the appearance may be. To rest, one summer 
noon, and let the gaze follow the mountain range along the horizon 
or a branch casting a shadow on the observer, until the moment or 
the hour participates in the appearance-that means to breathe the 
aura of these mountains, this branch. (Schriften, IM 378) 
In the experience of aura temporality nestles in the interior of the observer as 
a unique and unrepeatable moment in which this observer experiences the 
subtle shadings of a distant nearness with this branch or this mountain range. 
The craftsman also experiences the relationship to the natural object as 
distance because the nature s/he works on is intrinsically unknowable. I 
believe this distance is implied in the genealogical mystery surrounding the 
wild duck. But the creative transformation of natural objects brings them 
nearer to us without abolishing distance. This delicate and reverential 
interplay between proximity and distance suggests a vision of human activity 
that is ephemeral yet fully embodied, a vision that protests against the 
blindness of a radical disjunction between humans and nature without 
proclaiming the false universality of undifferentiated identity.12 
II 
Although I am using the Political and Economic Manuscripts of 1844 for 
the purpose of broadening the context of the play, I should point out that text 
and pre-text are not fully identical. When Benjamin referred to the 
powerlessness of the generation of the 1880s, he was, in fact, describing 
reactions to late capitalist power structures. The new modalities of capitalism 
have been extensively examined by Adorno, Horkheimer, and most 
systematically by Habermas. Stated in summary fashion, they have noted the 
following important changes: 1) the concentration of corporate capital 
accompanied by a large-scale proletarianization of small property owners, who 
were forced to sell their labor as workers or office employees; 2) the transfer 
of functions previously performed by the bourgeois family-capital 
accumulation, welfare, and education-to private and state institutions; 3) the 
rise of a mass culture that obscured real power relations; 4) the broad 
'instrumentalization' of human life which was uniformly subjected to the 
demands of private profit.13 All of these changes are relevant to a materialist 
reading of The Wild Duck. The imbalance between concentrated economic 
power and a powerless middle-class is dramatized by Haakon's rise to 
economic prominence and the social decline of the Ekdals. The destruction 
of the family culture, cutting across social class, is also part of the context. 
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Neither the Werles nor the Ekdals are capable of transmitting the patrimony 
of a patrilinear family order. But the Manuscripts are important for two good 
reasons. Marx stresses the devaluation of human experience and of nature in 
capitalist societies.14 There is also a strong resemblance between the 
allegorical hermeneutics of the Manuscripts and the allegorical dialectic of the 
studio and the loft which I have attempted to clarify through Benjamin's 
commentaries on the photographer and the collector. 
Marx discovers a repressed, embodied relationship to nature in the debris 
produced by capitalism analogous to the intuitive discoveries of the players in 
the loft. For Marx the allegorization of human experience is rooted in a 
system of concealed, indirect domination. According to Norman Geras 
. . . it is precisely an impersonal kind of domination exercised 
by the totality of economic relations over alt the agents of capitalist 
society, embracing also the capitalist whose overriding interest is the 
extraction of as much surplus labour as possible from the worker.15 
The presence of professional paraphernalia in the studio or the books and 
ledgers lying on Haakon's office desk point to a generalized dependence on the 
market and to the erosion of a previously sheltered domestic interior. The 
ambiguities surrounding Haakon's business ventures have been interpreted as 
proof positive of the text's open vision or as signs of Haakon's craftiness.16 But 
in the late capitalist context of the play it makes more sense to associate these 
ambiguities with the systemic, concealed nature of power. Haakon is a 
successful lumber merchant who got rich by harvesting logs illegally on 
government land. Apparently he pocketed his partner's share of the business 
when Ekdal went to prison. Hjalmar suggests as much when he explains how 
his family became impoverished: "We hadn't a shilling to spare—quite the 
reverse in fact. Debts. Mostly to your father, I believe--" (1132). Whether 
Haakon had no part in the swindle that made him rich or whether he was 
complicit does not really matter much. The fact that the issue of individual 
responsibility is ultimately undecidable-except by formal legal 
procedures-indicates that what occurs is propelled by its own inner logic. This 
impersonal modality of power would also explain Gregers's blindness. In his 
search for the culprit he clings desperately to the ideological fiction of the 
autonomous ethical subject of liberal bourgeois culture. But the Marxian 
interpretation of domination and The Wild Duck do not conform to the 
scenario of melodrama. They stage the dialectic of modern allegory. 
According to Marx alienated labor is the source of private wealth. The 
separate instances creating the photorealism of experience need not be recited 
in detail. The production process is independent of the workers; the objects 
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produced confront the producers as an alien power; the instruments and 
organization of production control the worker such that nature and human 
nature are experienced as alien and hostile powers: "Estranged labour not only 
(1) estranges nature from man and (2) estranges man from himself, from his 
own active function, from his vital activity; because of this it also estranges 
man from his species" (M 328). What links the different manifestations of 
alien life might best be clarified by the concept instrumental reason coined by 
Max Weber and extensively used by the Frankfurt School critics to designate, 
a.o., the allegorization of late capitalist life.17 Horkheimer defines the concept 
as follows: "It is essentially concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy 
of procedure for purposes more or less taken for granted and supposedly 
self-explanatory." (ER 3) While the need for self-preservation is usually 
invoked as ideological apology for the ends of instrumental reason, it actually 
co-ordinates and subjects human experience to calculable norms of efficient 
management and behavioral conformity to the requirements of corporate 
profit. The production process is not only independent from the agents of 
manual and intellectual production because they do not own the means of 
production. It is independent of all agents because it is organized in 
accordance with technological criteria of efficient and profitable production to 
which all agents must submit. Everything occurs without regard to the human 
reality of the agents unless of course that human reality can be exploited for 
profit. Workers sell their physical strength or technical skills in the market for 
pay. What they produce must appear alien because the full range of sentience 
that comes into play with the recognition of an essential connectedness with 
nature is repressed in the activity and erased from the products. Process and 
product are ultimately reduced to commodities, interchangeable entities whose 
value is solely determined by instrumental considerations of cost, price, and 
profit. This undifferentiated computation of nature and human nature is 
profoundly allegorical. The natural world, human activity, or the unique 
person or object have no intrinsic value. All phenomena are stripped of their 
singular and unique qualities. Emptied of all contents they point listlessly 
beyond their singular appearance to the carcéral uniformity of instrumental 
reason. 
Horkheimer contrasts instrumental reason with classical reason, with 
philosophy concerned about ends and the process of harmonizing human life 
with inner and outer nature. (ER 6-15) Classical reason stopped short at the 
boundaries set by the recognition that humans are also part of nature. This 
reverence for embodied life is also central to the Manuscripts: "If you ask 
about the creation of nature and of man, then you are abstracting from nature 
and from man" (M 357). The human being who objectifies herself or himself 
in the act of making things experiences the indissociable bonds with nature and 
her or his otherness at the same time. The human being is part of nature and 
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yet different from nature. The allegorical dialectic that sustains the Marxian 
Utopia of human praxis is often obscured by the language of Feuerbachian 
anthropology and Hegelian dialectics. The process of objectification can thus 
easily be misread as a dualism-the disjunction between the in-itself and the 
for-itself—or as an identity: 
For as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am 
not alone, I am another, a reality other than the object outside 
me. . . . To be sensuous, i.e. to be real, is to be an object of sense, 
a sensuous object. . . . To be sensuous is to suffer (to be subjected 
to the actions of another). . . . But man is not only a natural being; 
he is a human natural being; . . . he is a being for-himself and hence 
a species-being, as which he must confirm and realize himself both 
in his being and in his knowing (M 390-91). 
Objectification does not abolish the otherness of nature and other human 
beings. Transparent identity is impossible. But there is no radical, 
irremediable disjunction either: 
Man appropriates his essence in an integral way, as a total 
man. All his human relations to the world-seeing, hearing, smelling, 
tasting, feeling, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, loving--in 
short all the organs of his individuality . . . are in their objective 
approach or in their approach to the object the appropriation of that 
object. (M 351) 
The process of making, the objects made, and the perceptions formed by a 
mode of making that allow the free expression of human sentience also make 
the unknowable familiar without abolishing its otherness and the distant near 
without abolishing distance: "It is therefore in his fashioning of the objective 
that man really proves himself to be a species-being. Such production is his 
active species-life. Through it nature appears as his work and his reality" (M 
329). But this vision of a world in which humans and objects are freed from 
the curse of alienated labor elicits a reverential attitude toward this person or 
this artefact in this unrepeatable moment. The remembrance of a repressed, 
embodied mode of human making in which relations to objects and others are 
subtly interwoven in the play of proximity and distance has the power of social 
and political critique. Interpreted in the broader context of the Manuscripts 
the intuitive remembrance of this vision in the privacy of Hjalmar's loft can 
only be read as a critique of the devaluation of human experience in capitalist 
society. 
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Estrangement appears not only in the fact that my life belongs 
to another and that my desire is the inaccessible possession of 
another, but also in the fact that all things are other than themselves, 
and that my activity is other than itself, and that finally-and this 
goes for the capitalists too—an inhuman power rules over everything 
(AT 366). 
Marx expresses here what I interpret as an allegorical disjunction between 
sentient being and the inhuman authority of instrumental reason. In the 
dramatic text this disjunction is the work of Haakon's saws. Since his 
expensively furnished office front stage connects directly with the dining room 
rear stage, the visual field tends to obscure the relevance of Hoydal and the 
saw mill to the household. At first sight the space appears to introduce the 
viewer to the discrete charms and refinements of a substantive and cultivated 
bourgeoisie. But the papers and ledgers on the desk also indicate that the 
office is a place where Haakon squares his accounts with reality. Thus the 
office also connects the household to Hoydal as a signifier whose presence is 
carefully erased from the intimate sphere of the family. This is why the 
characters never fully comprehend what the saws destroy. Of course, the 
forest is converted into lumber. Lumber begets profit and profit social power. 
But the effects of the instrumental exploitation of nature are not limited to the 
destruction of EkdaTs hunting ground. In a terse reference to The Master 
Builder Benjamin remarked that ". . . the attempt by the individual to do battle 
with technology on the basis of his inwardness leads to his downfall." (R, P, 
CNC 155) This statement can only be understood fully when the intrications 
between the private and public life of the traditional bourgeoisie have been 
clarified in Part III. Yet it is important to note here that the text 
communicates the antonymic tensions between cultivated inwardness and the 
sway of an instrumental technology. By characterizing the invited guests as 
bald and flabby gentlemen (I 135-41), the didascalia reveal the dehumanizing 
power of instrumental reason. Sentient being is reduced to citations of a 
stigmatized nature mocking any pretense to inner cultivation. Haakon's saws 
cut into the sentient fabric of dramatic characters, splitting them into inhuman 
aliens who are controlled by powers they cannot comprehend and isolated, 
suffering humans, whose sentient being has no currency in the market of 
monetary exchange. Haakon's predatory violence is quite real, but also the 
alien power in him. "At your age," he tells his son, "it's time you find 
something more useful to do." (I 144) Haakon is other than himself insofar 
as the sum of economic and social relations have shaped his perceptions and 
actions in accordance with the requirements of capital. Gregers can be useful 
not by drudging like a common clerk at Hoydal, as he has done for years, but 
by consenting to be a partner in the business. But such promotion' would 
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require a subject who conforms to the criteria of an exploitative, impersonal 
work process. Haakon has only contempt for Gergers's desperate attempt to 
hold a cynical bourgeoisie accountable to the moral standards of its 
predecessors: "Werle (mutters scornfully after Gregers): Hm! Poor wretch! 
And he says he's not a romantic!1* (I 148) The pejorative reference to 
Gregers's romanticism and all that which can be loosely associated with the 
concept-imagination, ideals, moral courage—attests to the inhuman power of 
instrumental reason through which Haakon speaks and thinks as another. His 
psychic life is no less industrialized by his saws than Hjalmar by his cameras 
or by the ideological detritus of a defunct culture. But Haakon has only 
unmitigated contempt for a culture that was ideally lived as moral constraint 
in market relations and relations of desire. This is why his reputed infidelities 
appear emancipatory when compared to the repressive order of virtue so 
blindly defended by Gregers. But here too the norms of instrumental reason 
interpose themselves between his desire and the other. His relationship to 
Gina appears to have been no more than an exercise of the right to use and 
abuse one's property. The reverence for the distant yet near other that 
permeates the silence of the loft is far removed from the devaluation of eros 
to brief and forgettable sexual encounters. Haakon's desire-and this holds 
true for Gina-is the inaccessible possession of another. 
Human beings can never be completely instrumentalized; that is the root 
of their suffering and the source of hope. They do feel, sense, love, or pursue 
ideals, although they do so badly when the preternatural vampire called 
instrumental reason sucks the life-blood from their bodies. Even Haakon 
Werle, whose past is a battlefield strewn with shattered lives according to 
Gregers (1147), is not just the predatory other: 
I should like to have you living at home with me for a while. 
I am a lonely man, Gregers. I've always felt lonely, all my life, but 
especially now that I'm growing old, I need to have someone near 
me-. (1146) 
Here Haakon Werle is an embodied character living his unredeemed pathos 
in an isolation cell like the rest. When human beings are callously reduced to 
human resources and compelled to adjust their activity and psychic life to a 
highly rationalized and depersonalized production process, natural history, i.e., 
the sentient connectedness with nature, becomes a contemptible other because 
it runs counter to the imperatives of exploitation and ruthless domination of 
nature. Ekdal's and Relling's drunkenness, Hjalmar's felicitous quest for food, 
Haakon's desire or physical frailties are eruptions of a devalued sentience, 
signs of a repressed and bludgeoned life, but signs of life nevertheless. All 
characters experience the otherness they have become and, for most, that 
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otherness is the mark of humiliated life. Gina is not only an alien in her home 
because she has to hide her past, but because her malapropism, impatiently 
corrected by Hjalmar (III 185), brand her as the other, proletarian presence 
in a petty-bourgeois household. When Gregers accuses Hjalmar of denying his 
own father—Hjalmar had refused to acknowledge his father's unexpected and 
unwanted appearance at the Werle dinner party—Hjalmar responds: 
(whispering violently:) What Could I do? 
Gregers: You denied your own father? 
Hjalmar (in pain): Oh, if you were in my place-you'd-. (I 139) 
The didascalia clearly indicate that his pain and humiliation are real. Just as 
his spouse at home, Hjalmar is other than himself, a socially marginalized 
subject in the hierarchy of wealth and cultural legitimacy deriving from it. 
Only the child Hedvig is truly not other than herself until she is finally 
confronted on two sides with the violence that represses the insight of the 
allegorist into the common humanity of the species that knows its natural 
history. Her suicide only appears ambiguous on the surface. Gregers, who 
draws the child into his scheme of rescuing Hjalmar from the web of life-lies 
spun around him by the good Dr. Relling, asks her to sacrifice the wild duck 
for the sake of her father: ". . . Yes, but what if you now gave up the wild duck 
for his sake?" (IV 222) Hjalmar, who had rejected her because he is 
convinced she is Haakon's child, questions rhetorically if Hedvig would be 
capable of sacrificing her life for him: "If I were to ask her: 'Hedvig, will you 
sacrifice your life for me?'--(He laughs scornfully.) You'd hear what answer 
she'd give me!" (V 240) At that point the pistol shot is heard from the loft. 
The character Hedvig may have sacrificed herself for her father or she may 
simply have been incapable of killing the wild duck. But the deeper allegorical 
significance of her death is quite independent of psychological motives or 
intent. In rejecting the natural (illegitimate) child, Hjalmar insists at least 
formally on the containment of nature (desire) in culture (marriage). And by 
demanding the blood sacrifice of the wild duck, Gregers is equally bent on 
reactivating the mechanisms of cultural domination of nature. Gregers wants 
to reinscribe Hjalmar in the patrilinear tradition of the order of virtue through 
Hedvig. Her death is the ultimate and desperate gesture of protest against the 
allegorization of sentient life by capitalist culture in the modalities of Gregers's 
moral imperative and the amoral imperative of instrumental reason. Thus the 
dramatic resolution of conflict is consistent with my reading of the loft. 
Capital demands the sacrifice of the fullness of sentient being which Benjamin 
associates with childhood experience. 
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The centrality of the institution of marriage and child rearing to the 
Enlightenment and to domestic drama has been thoroughly documented.18 
Gregers's teleology of the ideal couple and the sobering reality of family life 
in both households as well as Gregers's and Relling's concern over Hedvig's 
education indicate a continuity between domestic and late domestic drama. 
But the twin pillars of classical bourgeois culture, marriage and cultural 
fathering, are processed as ruins in the allegorical form that contrasts the 
devaluation of human experience in late capitalist society with the 
remembrance of a sentient, distant nearness to inner and outer nature. 
Gregers's Utopia is no longer embedded in a living context of shared beliefs. 
Late capitalist society has effectively neutralized the family as agent of capital 
accumulation and education. In order to understand the untimeliness and 
allegorical nature of his ideal, the general outlines of the Frankfurt School's 
materialist reading of the practice and ideology of the liberal bourgeoisie 
should be borne in mind.19 According to Habermas the contradictory relations 
between practice and ideology derive from the fictitious identity of the roles 
of male property owner and the role of human being pure and simple. (TPS, 
p. 56) A highly abbreviated version of the general argument of the Frankfurt 
School would read somewhat like this. In the 18th century a small group of 
property owners competed against each other in the market. They believed 
that commodity exchange was regulated by just laws. Honesty, thrift, hard 
work, and the avoidance of pleasure would reap just rewards in the market. 
Virtue was the indispensable prerequisite of success in the market and success 
proof positive of virtuous conduct. One married to merge fortunes and 
educated children as ethical, autonomous individuals in accordance with the 
requirements of commodity exchange. As Horkheimer put it, the individual 
of Enlightenment culture was constructed ". . . to win the fight against nature 
in general, against others in particular, and against its own impulses." (ER 105) 
This culture was familial and patriarchal. The property owner rules supreme 
over spouse and children. But this is only one side of the equation. The 
liberal bourgeoisie insulated the family as much as possible from the alienating 
pressures of the market. It simply understood kinship relations differently and 
ideally: 
It [the family] seemed to be established voluntarily and by free 
individuals and to be maintained without coercion; it seemed to rest 
on the lasting community of love on the part of the two spouses; it 
seemed to permit that non-instrumental development of the faculties 
that marks the cultivated person. (TPS 46) 
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Although the non-instrumental development of an inner realm of common 
humanity bears certain resemblances to the experience of collector and child, 
it is not the same. I will return to this issue shortly. If children are educated 
for market competition on the one hand and treated as human beings in a 
non-coercive and loving enclave on the other, i.e, according to contradictory 
postulates, then the educational strategy must be coercive without giving the 
appearance of domination. In effect, children are taught to internalize the 
father voluntarily as conscience by appealing to their sense of shame. External 
authority is replaced by the authority of conscience. Self-inflicted violence lived 
as sacrifice of self substitutes for the violence of others.20 This idealized 
oedipal narrative in which subjects recognize themselves as an autonomous, 
ethical avant-garde of a Utopian order ruled by reason is the story in which the 
traditional bourgeoisie wrote its own continuity in time as a patrilinear order 
of virtue that appeared to conform to the laws of humanity itself.21 
This is the story Gregers remembers; but it is a story that can no longer 
be told. The authority of the pater familias and the ideal of the ethical, 
inner-directed individual are largely dependent on the autonomy of the small 
property owner. As long as the father has real economic power over spouse 
and children, indirect and psychological persuasion can be effective. And as 
long as the family is kept at some distance from economic necessity, it can 
cultivate the human being for his or her own sake. But when the market no 
longer behaves rationally, the ethical imperative becomes a free-floating 
signifier mocked by an amoral materialist practice. This is what occurs in The 
Wild Duck. The impoverishment of the Ekdals is the source of Werle wealth. 
The broad extension of instrumental reason devours the interior of the family. 
Haakon's office and Hjalmar's cameras equally refer to the intrusion of 
instrumental market relations into the family interior. And the pater familias 
survives only as photorealist discursive fragment in Hjalmar's confused mind 
and as decontextualized categorical imperative in Gregers's obsessive narrative. 
In fact, the family is already a private hell for the preceding generation. 
Haakon's marriage to Gregers's mother apparently was a mismatch between 
a predatory but vigorous capitalist and a spouse given to moral rigorism and 
self-sacrifice. (IV 212) Hjalmar realizes at long last that his marriage, far from 
having been voluntary, was cunningly arranged by Haakon Werle. (IV 205) 
Under circumstances which he cannot control Hjalmar is incapable of 
transmitting the patrimony of virtue and educate Hedvig in accordance with 
the secular gospel of enlightened reason and morality. The irrelevance of the 
father as moral authority internalized as conscience is further substantiated by 
the actions of Dr. Relling, whose therapeutic counsel can be summed up in his 
own apodictic statement: "Deprive the average human being of his life-he, and 
you rob him of his happiness." (V 229) As Jacques Donzelot has pointed out, 
family physicians and priests became the primary agents of an official policy 
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of family planning designed to help families adjust to the order of late 
capitalism.22 In order to infuse a dose of moral and educational hygiene into 
an anemic intimacy sphere, this avant-garde of modern therapeutocracy 
attempted to strengthen the role of the mother and weaken the culturally 
superfluous authority of the father. Gregers's enlightened Utopia has been 
dismantled and instrumentalized by administrative control. 
I cannot imagine a Gregers who does not convey the real grandeur of the 
humanistic ideals he defends so vigorously and so alone. And yet, this solitary 
intellectual, who is so alien in his body that he cannot even light a fire in the 
stove, fights for a disembodied Utopia. After Gina defiantly admits to an affair 
with Haakon, he believes that he has witnessed the rebirth of the ideal couple: 
"From such a crisis there must spring a mutual understanding on which a 
whole new life can be founded—a partnership built on truth, without 
concealment." (IV 207) Gregers's Utopia cannot be the source of hope he 
imagined it to be because the desire for a relationship that withstands the 
penetrating power of virtuous light necessarily contains desire in a subject that 
is at war with its own impulses. Nature as desire is not simply repressed. It 
must be an ever present yet always subjugated menace to culture. Hedvig has 
to be a natural daughter so that nature can be saved from itself by culture. 
And Gina must transgress and freely admit her fault so that conscience can 
sustain itself on guilt remembered. Gregers's response to the impersonal 
violence of instrumental reason is to displace violence inward and recreate the 
scene of the sado-masochistic individual. But in the loft, where the players 
intuitively rediscover their common, sentient humanity in the reverent care of 
distant nearness, the individual has been quietly liquidated. Haakon's marriage 
to Mrs. Soerby cannot be construed as the new dawn of the ideals of a by-gone 
era because the family no longer has discernible social functions. But their 
relationship comes closest to the truth of the allegorists of the loft: "Mrs. 
Soerby: . . . Now he [Haakon] can talk to me as freely as a child." (IV 212) 
While one can surely sympathize with Hjalmar, whose sense of justice is 
offended by the good fortune of the 'villain', one should bear in mind that he 
has accepted Gregers's melodramatic scenario. In the context of allegory, this 
abrupt change of fortune is not mere dramatic irony. Haakon, who is growing 
old and blind, experiences his sentient life as a species being. In being once 
again the child he had so violently repressed in himself, he becomes truly 
Hedvig's natural father. 
Eugene, Oregon 
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